The study indicates that the initial financial inputs have a threshold effect on subsequent economic performance of biomedical and pharmaceutical new firms. In the sample studied, unless these inputs reached the $850,000 to $1,000,000 mark (in 1970-1975 dollars) , technological innovation was negatively mediated by the risk associated with the use of firm's products and by the FDA quality control procedures. Consequently, attempts at technological innovativeness are unfortunately detrimental to economic performance of new and underfinanced firms in the biomedical and pharmaceutical industry.
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Technology, Risk Associated with Use, and the FDA The literature of technical entrepreneurship points to the importance of the main resources of a new technical enterprisetechnological know-how and financial resources (Roberts, 1968; Pankiewitz, 1980; Taylor, 1981; Utterback et al., 1983; Van de Ven et al., 1983) .
Recent work by Roberts et al. (1981) attempt to extrapolate from the research base of non-biomedical industries to set a structured research agenda for the biomedical field. The conceptual model ( Figure 1 ) presented by Moskowitz et al. (1981: 3-5) articulates the progression of technology from ideas to products and practices, and the interactions among people which facilitates this flow. These processes operate in a specific regulatory and marketing environment, which determines to great extent their structure, direction and intensity. More recent studies by Bernstein, Beaven, Kimberley, and Moch (1975) ,
and Leonard-Barton (1983) use similar premises and empirically validate the paradigm of diffusion of medical innovations as a two-stage communication process. Related studies focus on the relation between basic research and its application in medical practice (Comroe and Dripps, 1977) . The Committee on Technology and Health Care of the National Academy of Science (1979) provided rich conceptual background for the analysis of equipment-embodied medical technologies though most of the theoretical analysis is based on cursory empirical data.
The extensive regulatory constraints imposed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) emerge as one of the most significant differences of the biomedical industry vis-a-vis other technology-based industries. The extent of this external interference and control of quality standards is overwhelming, including both the efficacy and the safety of the product (pars. 510-515, FDA, 1976) . The regulations also include directions about manufacturing and record-keeping procedures (par. 501), and labeling and advertising standards (par. 502). Both sets of standards are far more rigorous than standards which apply to nonbiomedical industries. The structure of FDA regulations partitions the product areas of the biomedical industry into drugs and pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and paramedical products and supplies. The latter two categories were first regulated by Congressional action in 1976. Ashford, Butler and Zolt (1977) , Young (1982) , and Wardell (as cited in Roberts, 1981) analyzed the pharmaceutical industry and the influence of the FDA on its productivity and innovativeness. Another direction followed by Fuchs (1974) , Measday (1977) , and Temin (1979) focused on the changes in the pharmaceutical industry, historically analyzing the interaction between technology and the regulatory environment. Temin's study focused more on the economics of this industry. More recently Birnbaum (1984) assessed the strategic responses of firms in the X-ray equipment manufacturing industry to increasing regulation. These studies present strong evidence for the significance of the interplay between the regulatory constraints, and the innovativeness in this industry. Wardell (1974) Ashford et al. (1977) voice the same sentiments with some reservation related to the complexity of cost-benefit analysis of the impact of the FDA regulations.
Recently, Finkelstein and Homer (1984) (Gibson et al., 1983; Frost and Sullivan, 1983 ). Yet no research documents the role or issues of the young firm within this industry. 
Sample Selection and Data Collection
The sampling procedure used in this study differs to some extent from those used in prior studies of new firms (e.g., Roberts, 1968; Taylor, 1982; Utterback et al., 1983; Meyer and Roberts, 1984) .
Although our sample was clearly purposive, we attempted to make it as complete as possible.
Our assumption was that the data pertinent to our hypotheses would be available from firms with several specific attributes. First, the firms should be approximately one decade old, to allow sufficient time since incorporation so that their commercial performance is of a more stable pattern, after the initial start-up turmoil. On the other hand, to facilitate collection of first-hand data directly from the founders, the firms should not be older than 15-20 years, which age would increase the probability of founders' death or relocation, or of change of ownership since incorporation.
Second, the firms should have been formed for the purpose of doing business in the biomedical or the pharmaceutical industry, to present a more focused picture about young company operations in this specific area. Multi-product conglomerates clearly do not fit this requirement.
Third, to present as much as possible a comprehensive picture of the biomedical industry, the firms should be vertically integrated from R&D to marketing. Consequently, the firm should be an independent legal entity, not an R&D, manufacturing, or marketing arm of a larger corporation.
Adhering to the above criteria, the process of sample selection and data collection consisted of several stages. Second, the founders of the relevant firms, including those which had been dissolved, were located, to the extent possible.
Third, the research questionnaire was tested with the target population, modified from earlier work used by Roberts and Wainer (1971) , Taylor (1981) , and Utterback et al. (1982) . The main factors that were tested were the time required to complete the expanded questionnaire and the relevance and clarity of the new questions related to the medical context. The final research instruments consisted of a self-administered questionnaire, containing mainly well-structured and simple questions, and an interview questionnaire, containing unstructured or complicated issues which required real-time clarifications or explanations.
Fourth, founders' agreements to participate were secured. Among those who were not willing to participate at this stage the common explanation was "Don't want to talk". As much as the specific causes could be traced, they were usually "preoccupation with the current problems of the firm", or "the experience was too painful to walk through it again for research purposes".
Fifth, the self-administered questionnaire was mailed to 32 founders of biomedical firms (in addition to the pilot study) of which another 7 dropped out for various reasons. Some of the reasons that were mentioned: "I'm too busy with my clinical research in X University"; "The firm does not exist anymore"; "The questionnaire is too long"; "He does not have the time, and he doesn't want to talk" (secretary); "Although I'm willing to participate, I'm leaving for business negotiations to Europe till the end of March".
Sixth, field interviews with 25 founders were conducted, usually in their office. The founders of firms that were dissolved were interviewed at their homes or at the offices of their present employer.
Seventh, in addition to the data about the risk associated with use of their products that was collected directly from the entrepreneurs, we decided, due to the potential importance of this variable for causal analysis, to independently assess product risk by use of external experts.
Sample Evaluation
Three firms were screened out of the sample, two of them due to confounded background or inadequate data and another because it had actually been incorporated in the early sixties.
For the analysis of entrepreneurial background and the initial period of founding the firm, 28 cases were used, while for the detailed causal analysis, 26 cases were included. One of the 26 cases lacked data about entrepreneurial background, early founding, and financing.
The final sample included three firms from the pre-test, for which the data were collected in a slightly different format. Two firms that were actually incorporated in 1968 and 1969 were included in the sample, as representative of the agglomerates of firms founded by the same founders between 1965 and 1975.
It was not possible in all the cases to obtain the necessary information about the comparative performance or the product area of the firms which dropped out of our sample. As far as we can tell attrition biases are not significant. We know that at least one dropped-out firm has approximately 400 employees, and another is a successful producer of heart pacemakers. Two firms were active in the product area of drugs and pharmaceuticals and at least two were in auxiliary products.
We assume the attrition of firms which were dissolved, or encountered severe operational difficulties, was comparatively high.
At least one firm was under FDA investigation and could not participate in the study for legal reasons. Drugs On the other hand, we would contend that the firms included in the sample are representative of the population of medical instruments firms, as described by Dorfman (1982) and by Hekman (1980) . As also can be seen from the above anecdotal information about the reasons for self-elimination from the study, the firms that were excluded were of a broad range of sizes and of economic performances (see Appendix B
for sample attributes). The breakdown by year of incorporation of the sample selection and the data collection stages is summarized in Table   1 . Table 1 To derive the product specific technological index the above three scales were aggregated for each product separately (the alphas for the three products ranged between 0.50 and 0.60). The index of overall technological sophistication of the firm was derived by summing up the product specific indices and was found to be highly reliable (alpha=0.70).
Assessment of risk associated with use (RAWU)
The use of a panel of experts has been recommended for asses- 
Measurement of economic success
The evaluation of economic success is an interesting issue; several studies in the past used quite simple indicators of commercial success of new firms. Meyer and Roberts (1984) argue that growth rate of sales alone is not reliable because it is biased towards the fast growing young firms. They divided the growth in sales by the age of the firm, using an aggregate of the last two years to smooth for annual fluctuations. Taylor (1981, 15-16) 
Results

Technology and risk associated with use
The first in our chain of hypotheses was that technologically novel products will be concomitantly of high risk associated with their use. According to our findings (Table 2) , the strongest indicator of technological novelty of firm's products -"new technology or first of a kind" is positively associated with the RAWU Table 2 approximately here score of each firm's products. On the other hand, the average novelty of a firm's product specifications or purpose, and the calibre of firm's products or personnel, do not contribute to higher risk associated with their use. This finding, in addition to proving the main point of technological newness-RAWU association, also suggests a less "painful" alternative way for biomedical technological innovation -special specifications or special purpose, and not new technology or first of a kind. In contrast, the calibre of product or personnel is a passive descriptive concept, which does not imply a specific technolo-gical innovation strategy.
The impact of the FDA regulations
Before we address our second hypothesis, dealing with the causal relations between technology, risk associated with product use, and the impact of the FDA regulations, it is important to understand the various dimensions of the FDA requirements which bear upon the biomedical firm.
Sixty five percent of the products of the firms in our sample were regulated by the Bureau of Medical Devices of the FDA and 27% by either the Bureau of Drugs or Biologicals. Only two firms considered themselves not regulated at all, either because they had launched their products (medical devices or auxiliary products) before those categories were included in the FDA regulations, or because their products were quite removed from the clinical and consequently the regulated core of the industry.
The entrepreneurs reported that the FDA regulations influenced their product strategies on the average 3.2 points on a 5-point scale (64%), and their impact on the firm in general, as measured by the number of operational issues impacted by the regulations, 2.8 points on a similar 5-point scale (56%). Forty two percent reported that the regulations were prone to inconsistent interpretations of the FDA examiners, and 19% claimed that their products had actually been misclassified by these examiners into wrong categories, probably due to insufficient FDA professional understanding.
The medical devices and auxiliary products in our sample were mostly of FDA classes I and II (86%), which require nonclinical proof of safety and efficacy, while 14% were of class III, requiring clinical tests. The former products were usually approved in the frame of paragraph 510K of the 1976 amendment, which is known in the industrial jargon as the "510K form". Those firms had to wait on the average between 45 and 90 days for "approval from Washington", though for most of the firms (62%) the process did not take more than 45 days. The approval process for class I and II products usually did not require more than one additional iteration, initiated usually by the FDA examiners due to some missing data, product misclassification or simply lost correspondence. It is interesting to know whether the intervention by the federal authorities has been warranted by real issues of safety and efficacy of the products. Although our data do not address the cost-benefit analysis of government regulations, we tested whether products which were evaluated by the experts panel as having high RAWU drew more "fire" from the FDA . The data presented in Table 3 support the overall validity of at least the direction if not the intensity Table 3 approximately here of the FDA intervention. The correlations between RAWU and the impact of the FDA regulations on the firm, especially as measured by the overall RAWU of its products, are statistically significant. It seems logical that the impact of first product's RAWU was the most significant: launching a product of high risk associated with its use can be a quite critical event for a young firm. The increasing correlations between the FDA-precipitated expenses and the RAWU of products 2 and 3 is more difficult to explain. We hypothesize that most of the FDA expenses related to the first product were perceived by the interviewed entrepreneurs as founding expenses, while the expenses related to the second and third products were perceived as operational, and were reported as such.
The Financial Threshold Effect
The general financial attributes of biomedical firms are comparable to other technology-based enterprises (Table 4) . For instance, Taylor (1981) reported an average of $67,000 in initial equity and 48,000 in loans, totaling $115,000 in initial capital of his industrial "spin-off" firms that were founded between 1960 and 1981. In our sample the co-founders and their families provided approximately 62% of initial capital base, with venture capitalists and banks playing quite a minor role at this initial stage. The subsequent resource mobilization was more substantial, with an average of more than a million dollars in long-term capital, accompanied of course by gradual shifting of equity control of the firm away from its initial founders. External ownership increased from 10% to 23% on the average from founding till 1983, with at least five firms having been acquired by larger biomedical firms or by conglomerates. Table 4 approximately here At this stage of analysis the presence of financial outliers in the sample must be treated. Two firms, which incidentally have both recently been acquired, had extensive capital financing. These two firms succeeded in mobilizing $850,000 and a million dollars in initial financing, and their later public offerings generated additional $9.2 and $6.4 million dollars in equity, respectively. Their economic performances have been accordingly outstanding, with $30 and $9 million sales in 1983, averaging $24.4 and $7.2 million in annual sales between 1980 and 1983, respectively. In comparison, the total sample's annual sales mean (Table 5) for the same period was about $2.5 million (for the 22 enterprises which still independently existed in 1983). These 22 firms generated $55 million in sales in 1983, and about 1100 in employment, with the two outliers contributing approximately 60% to these figures. This concentration of success is not unlike the relative role of Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) among the 50 firms that had emerged from MIT's Lincoln Laboratory (see Table 5 The second hypothesized determinant of a firm's economic performance is its technological innovativeness, as measured by the technological sophistication of the firm's products. We found that the associations between the indicators of technological innovativeness of the firm's products and its average annual sales are somewhat ambiguous (Table 6) In accord with our previous findings it was essential to test these relations for the influence of the two financial-performance outliers. The results of this procedure are quite eloquent (Table 7) : the ambiguous positive relations between the indicators of technological innovativeness and economic success become explicitly and significantly negative for the 20 firms which could not mobilize the necessary "threshold" financing attained by the two performance outliers. Table 7 approximately here
The concept of minimal "threshold" financing, below which the net contribution of technological innovation to economic success becomes highly dubious, gains some support from our previous findings on the impact of the restrictive policies of the FDA. We should bear in mind that FDA policy has been especially critical to those firms which attempted to develop and market technologically novel products.
Putting it differently, unless the biomedical firm is adequately financed at founding (which in this sample from the 1970-1975 context meant between $850,000-1,000,000), its technological innovativeness will be detrimental to its economic performance. The mediating role of the risk associated with the use of firm's products, and the problems posed by the FDA "quality assurance" procedure, seem quite plausibly to be a severe externally imposed handicap on technologically innovative firms. Table 8 approximately here (Table 8 ). The sequence of these events in time is graphically described in Figure 2 . The formation of the products' attributes mostly took place The results of the regression analysis are indicative of the same process, already elicited through the bivariate inferential analysis. It seems from the regression that initial financing becomes quite inconsequentially related to economic performance of an average biomedical firm. On the other hand, the independent effect of technological innovation on the firm's success is negative and statistically significant; the role of the mediating RAWU is negative, though clearly not significant. Table 9 approximately here This analysis suggests that significant technological innovation in biomedical area should be undertaken only by those young firms which succeed in securing not less than some significant threshold level (here $850,000 to a million dollars) as initial founding capital. Otherwise the requirements of the product evaluation procedure, enforced by the FDA, will render these attempts at technological innovation economically counterproductive.
Alternatively, young and potentially innovative biomedical firms might seek to couple with the financial reources of larger corporations in strategic alliances aimed at achieving mutual benefits.
Managerial Implications
This study contributes to further understanding of a uniquely important feature of the medical field -that technical innovation is a double-edged sword, unlike in the other areas of technology. Greater innovation in the biomedical area generally brings with it higher risk associated with use of the medical products. In turn FDA regulatory impact directly correlates with the extent of assessed innovation. The implication is that unless the young company is particularly well financed, the effect of FDA regulation is to prevent the innovative firm from experiencing economic success in the marketplace. Excluding the firms that were dissolved, it averages $1161K. Average annual sales ($000)
Number of employees Proportion of exports(%) 1980 -1983 (22) Average annual sales ($000)
Number of employees Proportion of exports(%) 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1983 Total 
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